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Affect, Relationality and the
‘Problem of Personality’
Lisa Blackman
THIS ARTICLE will consider why William James’s formulation of the‘problem of personality’ is an important yet forgotten historicalantecedent of contemporary work across social and cultural theory
that is being described as ‘vitalist’ (Lash, 2006). New materialist vitalism
is one response to what are increasingly being framed as the limits and
problems of the foundational practices of sociology and cultural theory.
These include attention to the stasis and mechanism of cultural inscription
models that have emphasized being over becoming and structure over
process, as well as a renewed interest in the problem of affect, sensation
and perception (see Fraser et al., 2005; Lash, 2006). The interest in affect,
or what Teresa Brennan (2004) has termed the problem of affective trans-
mission, also reactivates questions that dominated and puzzled scientists
and philosophers who were writing within what has now been characterized
as a 19th-century science of association (Latour, 2002). These questions
related to events within populations that foregrounded the question of affec-
tive transmission or contagion. How was it that certain fashions, fads and
trends seemed to spread throughout populations with a rapidity that seemed
to defy the action of logic or rationality? How did certain fears and forms of
hysteria, mania and emotion spread such that they appeared to bypass
rationality and reason? What caused individuals in groups to behave in ways
that might perplex, bemuse or undermine their sense of themselves as
subjects in other contexts? What enabled certain individuals to command
the obedience, compliance, love and adoration of others, such that they
would be exalted and revered as charismatic leaders?
What lay in the background to these concerns, and the concepts that
guided their explanations, was both a fascination with and attempt to know
and understand experiences that were ephemeral, ‘invisible’ and marked by
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a dissolution of the boundaries between self and other, inside and outside
and human and non-human. Psychologists, philosophers and sociologists
were all drawn to phenomena that were little understood, but that seemed
to contain within their mysterious workings possible answers to the riddle
of what makes us both ‘one and many’. This problem was framed as the
problem of how to specify the relationship between social unity or uniformity
and individuation. Studies of hypnotic trance, psychical research, spiritu-
alism, psychotic delusions and hallucinations, and even studies of insect
societies such as wasps and hornets, were all seen to contain possible clues
that would reveal the enigma of how to specify the basis of (human)
communication.
The terms that coalesced in relation to this problem provided a set of
figurations that not only inspired the writings of early psychologists and soci-
ologists, but also have taken form in the imaginaries of those producing some
of the exciting work on affect that is taking hold across the humanities in
the present. What I want to do in this article is explore the historical
antecedents of some of this work by taking seriously matters spiritual,
psychic and psychopathological, and considering how these experiences
were connected up through a particular set of terms and concepts. It is this
lineage that for the most part is left out and occluded in contemporary theo-
rizing, but, as we will see, continues to haunt cultural theory in terms of the
practical and conceptual dilemmas it raises.
Vitalist Conceptions of Life
Elizabeth Grosz (2004) has argued that cultural theory must reinvet the
concepts of nature, matter and life in order to give complexity to the image
of the subject as one who is inscribed and inscribes themselves. Rather than
simply reject the idea of the subject as being culturally inscribed, she argues
that cultural theory must deal with the messy, accidental, contingent and
dynamic status of matter, which induces or makes possible the endless
constitution and reconstitution of subjects.
We need to understand not only how culture inscribes bodies – a preoccupa-
tion of much social and cultural theory in the past decade or so – but, more
urgently, what these bodies are such that inscription is possible, what it is in
the nature of bodies, in biological evolution that opens them up to cultural
inscription, social immersion, and production, that is to political, cultural and
conceptual evolution (Grosz, 2004: 2)
Her project is an exploration of life through the aligning of the philosophies
of Darwin, Nietzsche and Bergson; models which she suggests are intimately
tied to evolutionary research and also make possible the idea of ‘temporal
becoming’ (2004: 8). This exploration of life injects energy, force and
dynamism into matter, such that, rather than being the passive or inert stuff
of cultural inscription, it literally comes alive through its action as a key
process which induces cultural inscription. As she argues: ‘without some
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reconfigured concept of the biological body, models of subject-inscription,
production or constitution lack material force; paradoxically they lack
materiality’ (2004: 4). Grosz’s project is one that should be viewed as part
of a current trend in critical thinking across the humanities, that places the
reinvention and re-figuring of bodies, corporeality, matter, affect and even
life, as central concerns for addressing the question of ‘what makes us
human’ (Fraser et al., 2005; Latour, 2004; Massumi, 2002). This work is
hugely important and addresses the issues of change and transformation
through a recognition that materiality is governed by relations of indetermi-
nacy, contingency and openness. It is not simply stuff governed by psycho-
physical laws of determination, but an open system which combines,
re-combines and is articulated by other systems such that bodies are always
in a process of becoming (Latour, 2004).
I want to extend and add to this project by considering how the
psychological might be re-figured and re-invented in light of these argu-
ments. Although a key resource for many scholars within this emerging
field is the natural and physical sciences, the significance of the psycho-
logical sciences has been recognized as important for re-examining ques-
tions of ontology (Chertok and Stengers, 1992; Despret, 2004a, 2004b;
Latour, 2004). One example of such work pertinent to the concerns of this
article is the argument of Vicienne Despret (2004a), outlined in her recent
book Our Emotional Make-Up. She examines how a particular trope of
social influence is inscribed within the knowledge-practices of experimen-
tal psychology, such that social influence should ideally be kept at bay,
controlled for and eliminated. Despret (2004b) begins her story about this
trope of social influence and what it discloses about the history of psychol-
ogy, by recalling the case of ‘Hans’ (Pfungst, 2000). Hans was a horse who
appeared to be able to solve complex multiplication puzzles, and to make
judgements and discriminations between different colours and tones. He
apparently did this by stamping his hooves in response to questions posed
to him by his experimenter. Hans became a test case in experimental
psychology for the problem of social influence, conceived as the kinds of
bias which might produce responses contrived by the setting of the exper-
iment. As Despret (2004a) makes clear, the problem of social influence,
conceived in this way, has led experimental psychology to frame its study
through a concern with how to eliminate or eradicate so-called experimen-
tal bias (Rosenthal, 1966). Bias, or the compliance of experimental
subjects with the wishes or demands of the experimenter, are viewed as
‘parasitic supplements that seriously contaminate the purity of the exper-
iment’ (Despret, 2004a: 118). The problem of social influence that Despret
recounts has mutated within contemporary psychology into the problem of
affective self-containment. The late Teresa Brennan cogently shows in her
book, The Transmission of Affect (2004), how the assumption of a bounded
individual separate from others presents a number of ‘puzzling incon-
gruities’ for contemporary scholars across the humanities who are inter-
ested in theorizing affect.
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One such ‘conceptual oddity’ presented by Brennan is the documented
fact that affect can be passed and transmitted between people (2004: 1).
She argues that psychiatry, psychology and psychoanalysis work with the
assumption that the healthy person is self-contained and clearly bounded.
They know where they end and the other person begins. This is viewed as
the capacity of conscious deliberation; that is, forms of sympathetic identifi-
cation that are conscious, cognitive and perceptual (Leys, 1993). However,
what marks the experiences of many therapists and health care professionals
is not distance and deliberation, but rather a felt sense that affects are being
passed from the client to the therapist. This presumption of separation and
unified boundaries that is the goal or endpoint of the therapeutic process is
one that Leys (1993) traces back to the problem of suggestion that puzzled
Freud and other 19th-century writers. This puzzle framed various attempts
to theorize affect and forms of behaviour and experience that were marked
by automaticity and appeared to be involuntary and non-conscious. What
marked the human subject was not his or her separateness or boundedness,
but rather a radical relationality that opened out the subject to being
continually permeable to the influence of others. However, from the assump-
tion of radical relationality that we will see framed early attempts by
psychologists such as William James and sociologists such as Gabriel Tarde
(1962) to explain the basis of sociality, Leys (1993) and Brennan show how
these ideas have been marginalized and excluded in favour of what Brennan
terms the idea of ‘affective self-containment’ (2004: 2).
Despret shows how the idea of affective self-containment that is linked
to the ‘problem of social influence’ has excluded and silenced other versions
of social influence that show the tensions, fracture lines and contradictions
which this authorized psychological version instates. Despret revisits the
study of Hans and considers what other versions or propositions about this
study might redistribute social influence as a rather different kind of object.
In a reconsideration of the case of Hans, the experimental psychologist,
Pfungst (2000) argued that the horse must be reading cues – what we might
term ‘body leakage’ – unintentionally communicated by the experimenter.
It was concluded that, ‘unintentional minimal movements (so minimal they
had not been perceived until now) are performed by each of the humans for
whom Hans had successfully answered the questions’ (Despret, 2004a: 113).
Non-verbal communication or body language is usually framed within a
contrast between the authentic and the manipulated, the honest and the
deceptive, where body leakage is judged according to the extent to which
the person is revealing their feelings, which might be at odds with what they
are saying or doing. This presumes that self-performance is subject to forms
of emotion management, where it becomes a key site for the regulation of
feeling (Goffman, 1969; Hochschild, 1983), as well as being the place where
the supposed truth of the subject is revealed or disclosed (Fast, 1971).
Although, as is evident in the example that Despret develops, there are other
explanations of the idea of body leakage that exist as a remainder of or
excess to these versions.
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These repudiated versions have more in common with ideas of mental
touch that existed in more ethereal and spiritual traditions in the 19th
century (Connor, 2004; Durham Peters, 1999). Despret (2004a) shows how
psychologists have been forced to choose between psychological and socio-
logical versions of selfhood, with critical social psychologists opting for the
social as a constructive and determining force. The contrast between essen-
tialism and constructionism is one that separates the corporeal from the
social (usually read as the discursive or the textual) and has created an
impasse in studies of embodiment (Blackman, 2001). This condition of
deciding which is the site of determination of the psychological is not one
that Despret (2004a) is advocating. In a move which is typified by many
contemporary cultural theorists, she returns to the work of the 19th-century
philosopher and psychologist William James to develop a different way of
thinking about ‘practices of affect’. His philosophy is one which is
considered non-dualistic and connects up the body, world and conscious-
ness in a different and exciting way. The body, world and consciousness are
connected such that consciousness becomes a space of openness, flows, and
non-conscious and non-rational determinations. She argues that James
presented a philosophy which assumed ambiguous bodies and flexible
boundaries (2004b: 215). Subjects are articulated with, rather than imposed
upon. She says: ‘he gambled on practising science with a perplexed version
of his object; of carrying an object that resists determinations to exist, one
that transforms these determinations into versions’ (2004b: 210). James is
presented as a forefather to the view that what determines embodiment or
bodiliness is the capacity to affect and be affected. She argues that ‘having
a body means learning to be affected’ (Despret, 2004b: 213).
This practice of rescuing lost figures that exist within an historical
archive, and re-staging their theories within the context of contemporary
problems and questions is not a new enterprise. Philosophers have engaged
this practice in order to create wonder, and to enable the present to be seen
as a process of becoming rather than the natural and inevitable outcome of
historical processes. Deleuze (1992) has re-staged Spinoza’s philosophical
writings on ethics in order to re-figure the body as a process, rather than a
substance or essence. Latour (2004) has re-staged the work of Gabriel Tarde
in order to inject psychic energy into social processes, and Massumi (2002)
has re-staged the writings of William James (1890), in order to make visible
the limit of science’s ability to theorize affect, passion and emotion. Isabella
Stengers (1997: 49) has advocated a ‘going back’ in order to resurrect figures
that have seemingly been forgotten. She cogently shows how reversing the
logic of scientific invention enables one to see, in a contemporary light, how,
‘questions that have been abandoned or repudiated by one discipline have
moved silently into another, reappearing in a new theoretical context’. She
argues that it is never simply the case that questions have been definitively
abandoned or refused. What we might be more likely to see is the way in
which questions are slightly modified or translated, or particular theories
exist in a dynamic relationship with those that elide or disavow the claims
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they might make. This is the ‘background context’ that Despret (2004b)
argues is what makes practices of science-making so creative and inven-
tive. They exist in relations of disequilibrium, disqualification, coexistence,
conflict and continuation with those versions which are kept in the back-
ground. This relates to what Stengers (1997: 49) refers to as the ‘deep
communications beyond the proliferation of disciplines’.
In a consideration of the importance of William James’s concepts for
engendering new ways of imagining the subject, Jeremy Carrette (2002: xl)
makes the important point that acts of revival or resurrection are also often
‘acts of disciplinary amnesia’. He argues that any return to James must
attend to some of the forgettings and occlusions that have characterized his
figuring as one of the most important American psychologists of the 20th
century. One such occlusion that Carrette acknowledges but does not
examine is central to the concerns of this article; that is, ‘the importance of
the subliminal for examining the unknown dimensions of human experience’
(2002: xlvii). The notion of suggestibility, which became one such concept
for explaining this register, radically dissolved the distinction between self
and other, inside and outside, the human and non-human, the material and
ethereal, and the psychological and social. Despite its promise as a concept
for examining the potentiality of affect it has largely been ‘lost’, dissolved
into something else, or elided across the psychological and social sciences
throughout the 20th century. I will argue that, despite this, its continuing
importance increases, as recent vitalist work tries to revive something of the
conceptual vocabulary and theoretical traditions that once attended to
suggestibility (Borch, 2005, 2006; Chertok and Stengers, 1992; Orr, 2006).
How Can the Many Act as One?
The question of ‘the One and the Many’ was recognized by William James
as being a central problem for philosophical reflection (Adler, 1990). This
problem was translated by James into the ‘problem of personality’ that intro-
duced into psychology a ‘dynamic psychology of the subliminal’ (Taylor,
2002: xxxxvi [? xxxvi or xlvi]). James framed this problem as a problem of
how the subject achieved unity or could ‘hang together’ when the self was
divided from or discordant with itself due to a register of non-conscious
experience. James attested to the affectivity of this register through his fasci-
nation with anomalous experiences, such as experiences of conversion,
depression, psychotic hallucinations and delusions, multiple personality,
drug-induced states of altered consciousness, hypnosis, automatic writing
and medium-ship. His interest in these experiences is made most explicit
in Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (2002 [1902]),
but also forms the backdrop to his seminal work in psychology published
in the two volumes of The Principles of Psychology (1890). William James,
Henri Bergson and Gabriel Tarde were all members of the Institute of
Psychical Research in Paris, established in 1900. Bergson published a
series of lectures in his book translated into English with the title Mind-
Energy: Lectures and Essays (1920). The French original is entitled
32 Theory, Culture & Society 25(1)
027-051 085157 Blackman (D)  27/11/07  16:46  Page 32
L’Energie Spirituelle (Spiritual Energy). one of these lectures, also published
as chapter 3 in the book, ‘Phantasms of the Living’ and ‘Psychical Research’,
was given as a presidential address by Bergson to the Society for Psychical
Research in London on 28 May 1913. Thus, the ‘problem of personality’
was framed in this milieu through concepts derived from spiritualism,
studies of hypnotic trance, and psychotic hallucinations and delusions.
These concepts circulated across a range of sites and connected up
different contexts and metaphysical questions about the nature of conscious-
ness, humanness and spiritism.
James explicitly framed the importance of the ‘problem of personality’
in the foreword to a much-cited text written by the psychologist Sidis, titled,
The Psychology of Suggestion: A Research into the Subconscious Nature of
Man and Society (1898). The problem and meaning of personality, with
which James concerns himself, is one that was being transformed through
an emerging interest in the psychical processes that produce the possibility
of particular experiences of consciousness. These experiences were marked
for James by a visceral, affective felt sense of transformation, which would
often feel like a conversion, possession or even a miracle. These modes of
transformation were not achieved through conscious deliberation but, rather,
often occurred instantaneously, in ‘the twinkling of an eye’ (James, 2002
[1902]: 171). They were associated with what James termed an ‘energetic
character’ (2002 [1902]: 206), that would feel immediate, vital and intuitive
(2002 [1902]: 194). In Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human
Nature (2002 [1902]), James characterizes the forms of intensive attachment
that he seeks to explain as those that cannot be ‘thought away’ through the
cultivation of a habit or attitude of ‘healthy-mindedness’ (cf. Smiles, 1864).
Contrasting religious happiness with what he terms ‘the sick soul’, he argues
that what might be termed the ‘misery habit’ reveals the limits of such a
cognitivist and voluntarist position (2002 [1902]: 81). These affective
experiences, for James, should not be recast as signs of pathology, but rather
examined for the processes of subject formation that they make visible. As
he describes, what is of interest is not:
. . . the conception or intellectual perception of evil, but the grisly blood-
freezing, heart-palsying sensation of it close upon one, and no other concep-
tion or sensation able to live for a moment in its presence. (2002 [1902]: 129)
As he goes on to recount, ‘if you protest, my friend, wait till you arrive there
yourself!’ (2002 [1902]: 130). In one of the few books to consider the signifi-
cance of James’s interest in psychical phenomena and its relationship to the
development of his non-dualistic conception of consciousness, Murphy and
Ballou (1960) argue that his formulation of the ‘problem of personality’ was
the principle of unity for bringing together a diverse range of experiences
which have troubled and perplexed philosophers and scientists. These
include, ‘unconscious cerebration, dreams, hypnotism, hysteria, inspira-
tions of genius, the willing game, planchette, crystal-gazing, hallucinatory
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voices, apparitions of the dying, medium-trances, demoniacal possession,
clairvoyance (and) thought transference’ (1960: 219). These experiences
were seen to be unified or linked through the mechanism of suggestibility,
that was both inside and outside, individual and collective, psychological
and social. For James, the ‘problem of personality’ referred to what we might
term our aliveness – our capacity to live and to affect and be affected such
that we neither have a static continuity nor are continually in movement.
There is a principle of individuality existing simultaneously with the possi-
bility of cleavages, accidents and ruptures, animating the more porous and
permeable aspects of the self. This was aligned to the existence of a multi-
layered consciousness, which was seen to produce the possibility of
different modes of action, conscious and non-conscious. Importantly, in the
context of contemporary personality theory within the psychological
sciences, this principle of dissociation was not organized through a contrast
between the authentic and false self.
James’s interest in the ‘problem of personality’ therefore formulated
the question of the ‘one and many’; of how many minds act as one, ‘many
brains as one brain’ (Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University,
1909: 51) at many levels of complexity, including in this instance at the
level of consciousness. James asks:
What are the limits of the consciousness of a human being? Is ‘self’
consciousness only a part of the whole consciousness? Are there many ‘selves’
dissociated from one another? What is the medium of synthesis in a group of
associated ideas? (2002 [1902]: v)
If we situate Despret’s (2004b) revival of William James within this focus
on matters psychic, spiritual and psychopathological, what is striking about
her formulation is both its resonance with ideas of suggestibility that formed
an implicit and often explicit background in William James’s formulations
of consciousness, but also with how this complex view of the psychical is
not acknowledged or developed. The capacity to be affected, which formed
a central connective thread across many theories and philosophies in the
19th century, was concerned with ideas of mental touch. The capacity of the
body to affect and be affected was tied to the movement of processes which
would flow through bodies. This continuous flow was seen to produce
variation and discontinuity, registered as a feeling of sensation or affect.
This description of communication recast as psychic energy and located
within multi-directional movements of communication, was central to more
spiritual conceptions of communion in the 19th century. Durham Peters’
(1999: 1) illuminating genealogy of the modern idea of communication, or
at least its dream of being about the ‘mutual communion of souls’, is one
which he argues draws its foundational status from 19th-century spiritual-
ism. Durham Peters argues that this tradition took ideal communication as
happening best ‘when bodies and language are transcended in favour of
more ethereal modes of thought transference’ (1999: 64). Communication is
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not located within language and cognition, but works ‘at a distance’, through
light, sound, heat, gravity, magnetism, odours and affections; through a kind
of ‘sympathetic transmission’ (1999: 78). These assumptions were related to
theories of maternal impressions in the 19th century based on the idea that
there was an intimate and symbiotic relationship between the mother and
her foetus, such that the boundaries between self and (m)other were porous
and permeable. This folding and infolding between mother and foetus was
achieved through a kind of ‘sympathetic impression’ (Connor, 2004: 118).
Both could touch and be touched through processes of ‘psychic imprinting’
(2004: 103). This feminized space of relationality provided a way of thinking
about social influence, which did not instate the figure of the clearly
bounded individual exerting their will and exercising rationality as the
means to set them apart from others. The metaphor of psychic or mental
touch which produced this non-logocentric way of thinking about relation-
ality was one that depended on ‘the idea that the skin is not simply a
boundary or interface . . . the skin begins to wake and wonder, an actively
unfolding and self-forming organism rather than merely passive stuff’ (2004:
118).
The notion of being articulated with, which Despret (2004b) draws
from William James, is one that is also central to Bruno Latour’s (2004)
recent interventions within science studies. Latour uses the term articu-
lation to talk about bodies and subjects. Subjects can be articulated through
learning to be affected; ‘put into motion by other entities, humans or non-
humans’ (Latour, 2004: 205). This proposition assumes that subjects
embody the potential to be affected, and that this potential is maximized or
diminished through the way one is linked and articulated through relation-
ships with others, again human and non-human. The body is ‘a dynamic
trajectory’ and can become more or less sensitive to the elements that
mediate this potential (2004: 206). Latour gives the example of what it
means to become an apprentice within the perfume industry in France; what
does it mean to develop a good nose or sense of smell for odours? We might
think of this process as cognitive; as becoming able to discriminate smells
through a process of learning (as a disembodied practice of knowledge
acquisition). However, what it means to learn is considered an embodied
practice, which involves enacting and developing relationships with arte-
facts, techniques and technologies that define the particular social practice.
The notion of articulation assumes continuation and variation; to be articu-
lated with opens onto a potential ‘multiverse’,1 with the potential to become-
with in multiple, complex ways. The notion of the multiverse is aligned with
the work of Gabriel Tarde, whom Latour (2002) resurrects as the forefather
of actor-network theory.
The New Paradigm
The focus on how one can account for change and transformation other than
through a gradual process of growth, aligns James’s work with that of others,
such as Gabriel Tarde, who have now been re-staged within the context of
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a ‘new vitalism’ (Blackman, 2007; Fraser et al., 2005). Notions of
suggestibility derived from studies of hypnotic trance and studies of the
psychical also formed the backdrop to the French sociologist and psychol-
ogist’s reflections. His writings on imitation and monadology have been
shown to be central to the materialist approach to becoming formulated by
Deleuze (Alliez, 2001). He is also seen to provide a ‘toolbox’ in the present
for understanding how an affective register is marshalled within technol-
ogies of advanced capitalism (Latour, 2002; Lazzarato, 2004). The return to
Tarde, or what Alliez terms ‘tardomania’ (200?: 2) has revealed that, despite
his disqualification by Durkheim and French sociology, his concept of
imitation nevertheless became an important ‘foundation of the social
sciences’ (Barrows, 1981: 139; Borch 2005). Tarde’s writings were also
central to the formation of Anglo-American social psychology (Blackman,
2007; McDougall, 1910; Ross, 1909), where notions of suggestibility and
imitation became important concepts for addressing the problem of meta-
morphosis. This problem was usually framed as a problem of the crowd; of
how an individual can become a particular kind of social animal (Moscovici,
1985: 4). Thus what we can see is the broader field that distributed particu-
lar terms and concepts, such as suggestibility and imitation, to address
particular problems. The concepts which articulated these problems circu-
lated within a variety of perspectives across the social sciences, and under-
stood so-called normal or ordinary suggestibility as being a key process for
understanding the ‘nature of social forces’ (Sidis, 1898: 3).
This attention to realms of non-conscious perception is increasingly
being recognized in the present as an important yet neglected aspect of
theorizations of affect and intensity (Connolly, 2002; Orr, 2006; Thrift,
2004). It is also being recognized in a contemporary context that the
concepts of suggestibility and hypnotic trance, which were central to the
‘problem of personality’ and its framing (and the associated framing of the
problem of crowd psychology or sociology), are still of huge importance for
social theory (Borch, 2005, 2006; Chertok and Stengers, 1992). However,
in many discussions of affective transmission within contemporary theory,
the importance of suggestion as an explanatory concept is disavowed, denied
or assumed to be over (Brennan, 2004; Connolly, 2002; Massumi, 2002).
The psychic or realm of the non-conscious is often replaced by either the
endocrinological system (Brennan, 2004), the neurophysiological (Connolly,
2002), the neuroscientific (Massumi, 2002) or the gastroenterological
(Wilson, 2004), such that the problem of suggestion appears to have been
resolved. Connolly does at least acknowledge James’s interest in hypnosis
and the idea of a subliminal self, but assumes that this register of life can
be explained through contemporary neuroscientific research.
In his book, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation,
Massumi (2002) defines the body as being characterized by its capacity for
movement and change. This definition is counterposed to approaches to the
discursive body that have freeze-framed the body within a range of social
positionings that ‘subtract movement from the picture’ (2002: 3). Massumi
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also advocates a turn to affect to capture this movement and change, but
laments the lack of a conceptual framework within cultural theory to address
its logic. Massumi traces a lineage to the work of William James and Henri
Bergson to specify the importance of a vital force, but, as with much work
within this tradition, also silences their interest in psychopathology,
hypnotic suggestibility and psychic phenomena that engendered this set of
terms and concepts. Massumi turns to cognitive neuroscience to find a
conceptual language for cultural theory that will allow affect to take form.
This retreat to the singular body to explain the performative force of prac-
tices has led cultural theorists like Brennan, Wilson, Massumi and Connolly
to the neuro-hormonal body, the nervous system, the perceptual system and
the brain to explain affective transmission. The very inside/outside distinc-
tion that suggestion (or a mimetic paradigm) displaces is replaced by a
singular body, and with knowledge practices like the ‘hard’ edges of the
psychological and biological sciences concerned with what is taken to be
located within the boundaries of the person. It is true to say that even the
‘hard’ edges of the psychological and biological sciences recognize that
there is more to the subject than what is inside. However, the problem
becomes a perennial problem: how to explain how the outside gets in?
The framing of this question presumes a clear distinction between the
psychological and the social, the inside and outside, and tends to draw on
behaviourist models of socialization, as in the work of the neuroscientist
Damasio (2000), for example. This reifies the very model of social influence,
embodied in the dualism between nature and nurture, that has beset the
psychological and biological sciences since at least the turn of the last century,
and engenders some of the very paradoxes and dilemmas that cultural theory
is attempting to move beyond: that is, the problem of structure and agency and
the individual and society. I am not suggesting that we should choose mimesis
over anti-mimesis. As Leys (1993) cogently argues, this would assume that
suggestion is a continuous object that simply needs to be recovered. As she
shows in her consideration of hypnotic techniques in relation to the reha-
bilitation from trauma, hypnosis itself takes form as a very different kind of
object across a range of practices and techniques. However, reifying the
subject as an information-processing machine, or a neuro-hormonal subject,
does not resolve the practical difficulties of refusing suggestion. Rather than
attempt to resolve the question in favour of one or the other side of the
dichotomy, I seek instead to explore what suggestion might become if we
reactivate some of what has been occluded, forgotten and silenced in the
revival of the vitalism of James, Tarde and Bergson for example.
The Problem of Metamorphosis
Like hypnosis, suggestibility has taken on a predominantly pejorative mean-
ing denoting an illegitimate influence, that is, an influence the acceptance of
which cannot be rationally justified by the one who accepts it. Suggestion is
impure; it is the uncontrollable par excellence. (Chertok and Stengers, 1992:
xvi)
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In this section I wish to examine some of the historical antecedents that led
suggestion to be translated into a problem of abnormal suggestion. This
redistribution of a particular model of social influence is one that many
contemporary authors assume in their writings, and prevents a serious
engagement with its implications in relation to affect and relationality (see
Brennan, 2004; Connolly, 2002; Massumi, 2002; Wilson, 2004). This will
entail taking a closer look at a set of debates that were there at the very
beginning of the emergence of the psychological sciences, and that are being
reactivated, albeit in a disavowed form, within contemporary approaches to
affective transmission within cultural theory. As we have seen Brennan
(2004) suggests that what characterizes contemporary approaches to affect
across the psychological sciences is an understanding of affective self-
containment. That is a model of social influence that presumes that, ideally,
the subject is self-enclosed and bounded, able to clearly separate them-
selves from others. This model of the rational, bounded individual, although
now the regulatory ideal within the psychological sciences (Despret, 2004a),
took form through the dissolving of suggestion into a problem of will or inhi-
bition (Smith, 1992). Suggestibility was increasingly taken to refer to the
lack of a set of competences that would enable the subject to withstand
social influence and therefore separate themselves from others. It became
the property of individuals and groups who were considered bio-socially
inferior and susceptible to a kind of atrophy of thought and development.
Thus suggestibility was to become a problem of left-over animality (see
Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001). This translation can be mapped in the
writings of McDougall (1910) and Ross (1909), who are both considered
founders of Anglo-American social psychology (Kremor et al., 2003; Sherif
and Sherif, 1956).
We can see this redistribution clearly if we examine the place of the
subject within the beginnings of what has come to be known as ‘mass
psychology’ (Moscovici, 1985). Moscovici suggests that Le Bon (1922),
Tarde (1962) and Freud (1921) all helped to shape the parameters of this
field of study, and translated notions of suggestibility through contrasts
which began to distinguish leaders from followers. Thus the ‘problem of
social unity’ – of how particular ideas, beliefs, customs and practices would
spread through a social field, was framed by Tarde through the concepts of
invention and imitation (1962). For Tarde, imitation (as a form of sugges-
tion) was a basic process of social life, but was also governed by laws of
regularity which could be attributed to the action of invention. Invention was
also a social process which determined which ideas were to spread, from
whom to whom, but was governed by principles which delineated what Tarde
(1962) termed the ‘leader principle’. Thus, quite simply, there were those
subjects who were seen to have the capacity to lead, to influence, and those
who were more likely to copy. However, this was not a form of mechanical
copying, but rather a process of mimetic desire which was thought through
concepts derived from hypnotic trance and related phenomenon. Although
Christian Borch (2005: 87) has argued that Tarde’s focus on imitation was
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also functionally differentiated through spatialized distinctions between the
rural and the city, with the city considered the ‘point of radiation’ of imita-
tions, this aspect of Tarde’s thought was of less interest to the emerging
social psychological sciences. What was affected within the emergence and
shaping of this disciplinary specialization was the importance of the concept
of psychological type as distinct from the concept of personality mobilized
within James’s (1890) writings.
Within social psychology, the redistribution of suggestibility into
abnormal suggestion allowed for the intermingling and crossing of the
boundaries and separations integral to the modernist subject through a
particular register of individual and social pathology. This was cross-cut by
classed, raced and gendered lines. Thus, particular passions, affects and
forms of psychopathology were distributed across populations such that they
became attached or fixed to particular bodies and cultural objects. Women,
the working classes, colonial subjects and children were all viewed as more
suggestible and amenable to processes of social influence, which might
result in what Guattari (1984: 36) has termed ‘subjected groups’. This term
was used by Guattari to describe the kinds of solidification of affect, ideas
and belief which characterized individuals who were seen to become fixated
in relation to a particular institutional object or figure. A particular psychol-
ogy of boundedness was invoked to explain the competences which allowed
individuals to withstand rather than submit to particular beliefs, ideas and
customs. The endpoint of the complex interweaving of the impulsive and
the environmental, the inherited and the acquired, which is found in the
accounts of the social psychologists McDougall (1910) and Ross (1909), are
crystallized in the concept of inhibition (Smith, 1992). Thus ‘the self-reliant
man [sic] of settled convictions’ (McDougall, 1910: 98), or those of ‘strong,
robust individuality’ (Ross, 1909: 83), were more likely to invent, rather
than imitate in a Tardian sense.
This resolution of the ‘problem of personality’ characterized social
influence as a force or threat to the boundaries of the atomized individual.
This form of psychological control became what Smith (1992: 114) identi-
fies as a ‘nodal position’, in what was to become a common discourse about
the nature of humanness. It was this mode of continuity and its repeatabil-
ity and iterability which linked a diverse range of sites, including neuro-
physiology, general physiology, neurology, psychiatry, experimental
psychology and philosophy (Smith, 1992). Smith’s genealogy of the term
‘inhibition’ explores how inhibition and will became increasingly integrated
and linked through a developing science of control and communication,
established in the neurosciences in the 20th century. This research and its
connections across disciplinary specializations particularly focused upon
what was known as the ‘reflex model’. Mechanisms known to regulate the
reflexes were viewed as analogous to those physical mechanisms seen to
provide the basis of psychological or voluntary control. Habits were those
acquired patterns of associations which could limit the scope of reflex
actions (the automatic), and therefore initiate movement through particular
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patterns of reflection, association and habit. This was often equated with the
building and cultivation of corresponding reflexes. This concern with the
inhibitory action of the reflexes and the will was the focus of the experimen-
tal psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt (1910), who attempted to identify the local-
ized centres through which the higher and lower functions were integrated
and balanced – what he termed apperception. However, for many authors the
distinction between the simple and the complex was used as a means to
differentiate so called ‘lower human types’ from those who were seen to be
able to develop complex associative patterns to regulate the reflexes. Thus
sensation or feeling, through this distinction, would not meet much antago-
nism or interference in certain ‘types’ of people, and would form the basis
of immediate, so-called instinctual or automatic action. These distinctions
formed the basis of the very particular colonial and class-based project,
which was extended, authorized and developed within the emerging human,
and particularly psychological, sciences (Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001;
Henriques et al., 1984; Rose, 1985, 1989).
The Problem of Suggestibility
The resurrection of Gabriel Tarde’s writings within contemporary social
theory, and specifically his lauding as a forefather of Actor Network Theory
(Latour, 2002, 2005), fails to recognize the hierarchical view of humanity
that was being proselytized in his elucidations of the concepts of invention
and imitation. Although the tendency to flatten his theories to inject a kind
of psychic energy into social processes is an interesting move (see Toews,
2003), I want to investigate what the remainder or excess which has been
left out can tell us about the way particular notions of affect have been
mobilized to address the apparent stasis of cultural inscription models
across the humanities. I want to contend that, important as this work is, it
tends to extinguish and iron out a more serious engagement with the impli-
cations of this work for re-figuring the psychological. Tarde engaged with
and reworked concepts from evolutionary biology (see Barrows, 1981, for a
more detailed discussion), and established a set of contrasts between the
higher and the lower, the civilized and the animal, and the leader and the
follower, in his discussions of the importance of understanding social influ-
ence processes conceived as a form of hypnotic suggestibility. The key senti-
ment of Tarde’s work, and its political bent, resonated with many writers of
the time and put forward a particular knowledge of crowd psychology as
providing the means to better equip bona fide leaders to govern and there-
fore avoid fascist dictators having effects on vulnerable minds (Apfelbaum
and McGuire, 1986; Barrows, 1981; Moscovici, 1985).2
What we can clearly see within a field of increasing unification is the
aligning of so-called forms of social disorder with a hierarchical establish-
ment of sets of contrasts which placed the nervous system and the brain as
being ordered from higher to lower functions. Inhibition or will became a
major focus of attention and analysis across a range of different contexts, in
which it ‘returned in endless variations’ (Smith, 1992: 69). The capacity to
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exercise control in the face of imitative processes was aligned with the will,
volition, the brain and reason, with the spine, emotion, automatism and the
involuntary providing the limits of the person’s capacity to invent rather than
imitate. These differentiations were woven together in different ways across
the social and physical sciences, where ‘the term inhibition gave a physical
appearance to the psychological will’ (Smith, 1992: 168). Thus a field of
complex processes characterized by distinctions between the inner and the
outer, the corporeal and the incorporeal, the physical and the social, and
the voluntary and the involuntary were redistributed through a common
nodal point. These had previously been matters considered undecidable and
a source of wonder and perplexity (James, 2002 [1902]). This common
grounding or ‘nodal position’ was one which attempted to weave together the
paradox between movement and fixity, between flight and becoming
arrested, and between the automatic and the habitual. This was
accomplished through the combination, association and substitution of
concepts from evolutionary biology, neuro-physiology, neuroscience and
psychology, with concepts derived from studies of consciousness, which
originated in sites concerned with matters spiritual, psychic and non-
conscious. The distinction between flexibility and rigidity, movement and
fixity, and their mapping onto contrasts central to evolutionary biology and
psychology were evident in the philosophies of Bergson, James and Tarde.
The Subject as a Node within a Network
David Toews’ (2003: 87) evaluation of the ‘new Tarde’, asks ‘why new
sources for social theory are being sought in a pre-Enlightenment mode of
discourse’? Some of the characteristics and criteria sought in this revisiting
are those that are beginning to shape the parameters of some of cultural
theory’s engagement with affect. Toews (2003) recognizes that what he terms
a metaphysical-theological-social opening is being ushered in, although,
Tarde’s fascination with the psychic, and psychical research, has been
largely written out of this contemporary story. He is seen to provide social
theory with a way of conceiving of the individual subject as a node within
a network rather than as an atomized individual (Latour, 2002). Invention
is not about will or volition, but relates to more complex processes of imita-
tion, which, as we have seen, were reliant upon understandings of
suggestibility derived from studies of hypnotic trance and mediumistic
phenomena.3 Tarde is seen to provide a modelling of psychosocial processes
which is compositional – about a coming-together which cannot be predicted
from the component parts or interactions. Regularity is due to repetition and
duplication which is not imposed on individuals but in-folded, such that
there is no separation between the individual and the social. The individ-
ual as a node simply provides a point of dynamic interchange for the psychic
energy which characterizes the flow between actors within a complex social
field.
Although this provides a relational model for contemporary social and
cultural theory, and brings affect and intersubjectivity into alignment, it
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nevertheless leaves out important parts of the context of Tarde’s writings.
Toews (2003) highlights how Tarde inspired the philosophy of Deleuze,
particularly in Difference and Repetition (1994), but was rejected in Anti-
Oedipus for what Deleuze referred to as his ‘model of the family in the realm
of culture’ (Toews, 2003: 93). In line with other philosophies at the time,
and particularly that of Henri Bergson, repetition was not spatialized and
located within relations of force, but linked to duration and a less linear
conception of time. However, as Toews (2003: 95) highlights, ‘repetition in
social affairs is not some neutral, gender-free event’. This statement points
towards at least some of the ways in which the concept of repetition, as
imitation, was circumscribed and delineated through the formation of
particular psychosocial types. As we have seen, the limits of invention, and
its relationship to imitation, were set by differences that were viewed as
constitutional, genetic, biological and established along thoroughly
gendered, classed and raced lines. The subject as a node was not a general
or generic subject, but one who was very much embodied in terms of
relations of distinction and differentiation. Not all nodes were equal, and
imitation, as we have seen, became, through Tarde’s engagement and its
extension with social psychology, a measure of a range of competences that
were viewed as part of the ‘make-up’ of particular psychological subjects.
By making the subject a generic node, one is in danger of disavowing those
distinctions which produce difference as inferiority, couched in relational
terms, such as the simple, the involuntary, the emotional, the instinctual
and, of course, the feminine. I am interested in how we might reconfigure
the idea of the node so that it does not merely refer to the flow of psychic
energy or intensity across bodies, but can explore intersubjectivity and rela-
tionality without re-introducing an idea of psychosocial type as a set of fixed
characteristics and attributes. This will involve a radical rethinking and
reflection on the versions of psychological matter that our social theoriza-
tions rely upon, and which are largely rendered implicit or brought in
through the back door (Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001).
The turn to philosophy and forgotten philosophers as a means of
creating new alliances and concepts for social and cultural theory, carries
with it the danger, therefore, of missing how particular concepts became
central to the regulation and management of populations. The lack of atten-
tion to the ways these terms circulated within the 19th century and were
specified within the human sciences, negates the way that movement and
flow have always been thwarted by what has been confined to the animal,
the instinctual, the irrational and the so-called primitive. That these terms
were also differentiated through gendered, raced and classed distinctions
throws further doubt on the viability of authorizing generic conditions to
describe becoming. Whether we are talking about the subject as a node, or
having the potential to be affected, these positions are never neutral or
general. The re-articulation of these terms, within the context of contempor-
ary cultural theory, is an important move away from the idea of essences,
and does much to compensate for the ignoring of the materiality of subjects
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that has characterized deconstructionist work. However, the issues of power
and regulation are still as crucial as considering flows and movement, even
if we might need new tools to think about this dynamic intersection.
This seems to me increasingly pertinent given that Latour (2004) only
seems able to conceive of blockage or becoming-stuck in negative terms,
reproducing some of the very distinctions that re-figured suggestion as
abnormal suggestibility. Latour (2004) argues that the concept of sensitiv-
ity relates to an awareness of the relationships that you are being articu-
lated with – a becoming-aware that does not imply certainty of knowledge
or mediation (for there are complex relational dynamics which articulate
subjects), but does assume an attunement of the subject with their more
permeable and porous boundaries. To be moved implies an awareness, and,
as Latour suggests in the context of what it means to have a body, to be put
into motion requires a registering of this motion as, ‘if you are not engaged
in this learning you become insensitive, dumb, you drop dead’ (2004: 205).
This rather facetious remark, which opens Latour’s paper, shows that,
despite the gesturing to the interplay of movement and becoming-stuck he
makes at points throughout his argument, the latter state is one which is
pathological and to be avoided. Fixity, constancy and solidity delineate
unintelligent learning and confine subjects to inertia; the shadowy other to
the ontology of movement which arguably Latour’s philosophy is part and
parcel of. It is at this point that I would like to return to William James and
explore some of the tensions and occlusions that framed James’s discussion
of suggestion in order to open up a rather different discussion about what
suggestion might become. This is not simply to resurrect James as an import-
ant hero who can offer resolutions to the problem of affectivity, but rather
to draw out ‘the confusions of a subject, its fault lines and paradoxes’ to
reveal more closely the problems of ‘closure’ that exist in the current
shaping of new material vitalisms (Carrette, 2002: xliv).
The Reinvention of (Psychological) Life
One of the paradoxes that govern James’s framing of the ‘problem of person-
ality’ was the ‘problem of the cohesion of the subject’ (Carrette, 2002: xli).
In Varieties of Religious Experience, James focuses upon the subject ‘in a
mode of unknowingness’ (Butler, 2004: 30). This is a mode of psychological
life that explores how the boundaries between self and other are fragile,
porous and permeable, such that one can ‘be periodically undone and open
to becoming unbounded (Butler, 2004: 28) James’s mobilization of sugges-
tion is one concept for explaining the existence and ramifications of the
register of the subliminal that he mobilizes to explore this permeability.
However, he does not assume that the subject can ‘overcome’ this register
through conscious deliberation or an act of will. The intensive attachments
he explores are those which have an affective force, and that are difficult to
reason away. However, he is also clear that suggestion as a concept tells us
nothing unless we can examine the affective and performative force of
particular practices; of which ideas are efficacious at particular times for
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particular individuals. The complex view of relationality that James was
beginning to develop is one that could be augmented by a return to the work
of R.D. Laing, who was writing in the same anti-psychiatric context that
inspired the work of Deleuze and Guattari (Guattari, 1984). I would argue
that Laing’s discussion of affect and relationality, and his energetic concep-
tion of the subject is one that has a lineage to the work of James and his
‘problem of personality’. It is this lineage that might be most productively
exploited in order to reinvet suggestion as a phenomenon that is both inside
and outside, psychic and social, material and ephemeral for example.
They are playing a game. They are playing at not playing a game. If I show
them I see they are, I shall break the rules and they will punish me. I must
play their game, of not seeing I see the game. (Laing, 1970: 1)
Laing’s poetic translations of the flows of conscious and unconscious
dynamics produced across relational practices, constantly mutating and
reconverging with an affective force, captures some of the issues I wish to
foreground in my discussion. Laing described Knots (1970) as a fictional
account of the kinds of dynamic patterns he had observed in his analytic
practice, and which he used the words ‘knots’, ‘tangles’, ‘fankles’,
‘impasses’, ‘disjunctions’, ‘whirligogs’ and ‘binds’ to describe. The knots
refer to those relational connections that circulate between people that are
characterized by a kind of rhythmic repetition. This rhythmic repetition is
not simply a fixity of habitual thought, but rather forms of dialogue and
reflection that displace the very idea of a clear and distinct separation and
boundary of self from other and inside from outside. Laing also referred to
them as ‘webs of maya’ (1970: Foreword) disclosing his interest, perhaps,
in forms of energetic exchange or interchange that have a kind of psychic
pull. We get caught up in these webs, perhaps losing our way or being unable
to navigate. They are not us, but equally they reveal the positions we try to
invest in to resolve or rid ourselves of the unbearable tension these webs
might create. The knots also reveal the complexity of how we might become
an unwitting host, expressing a relational dynamic through the singular body
as depression, neurosis, psychosis, paranoia and so forth. Laing famously
described one such double-bind in the context of a family member who
expresses, through a psychotic episode, the connections or relational
dynamics which bind the participants. What we have here is an extreme
state of bodily affectivity linked to a particular set of relational dynamics or
connections which might usually remain invisible or occluded.
Laing, like many of his contemporaries was interested in the relation-
ship between energetic transmission and rhythm. He drew on a contagion
model, but this was a model that foregrounded the subject as a particular
kind of host. The host would act as a kind of concealed carrier of relational
dynamics which he or she was positioned within and could not necessarily
articulate; except in some cases through extreme forms of bodily affectivity.
These forms of secret madness, usually expressed through a singular body,
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could be thought of as enactments of a disharmony or attunement of the
subject to relational dynamics which are hidden or covered over. This is a
kind of rhythm analysis, which explores how some subjects might resonate
with and through these energies, resulting in blockages or forms of inertia.
Laing was interested in the concept of entrainment that had been developed
in the work of geophysicists such as Shumans, who had explored how brain-
waves can become attuned to naturally circulating rhythmic signals (see
Becker and Shelden, 1985). What is passed between participants is a form
of energetic exchange that is felt within an affective register, and which is
not easily available for conscious deliberation. It is not that affect or emotion
is simply ‘caught’ or transmitted between subjects, but that subjects get
‘caught up in’ relational dynamics that exhibit a psychic or intensive pull.
What this work draws attention to is the complexity of the relationship
between energy, transmission and rhythm. The concept of entrainment that
Laing mobilizes is one that presumes the subject is porous and permeable,
rather than being affectively self-contained. Laing’s project was a map of
the power relationships that governed these energetic exchanges, where
certain people’s rhythms were subsumed, or blocked by others. The
dialogues he observed in his practice were not ‘simple affective transfers’
(Brennan, 2004: 49), but complex affective cycles that Laing situated within
family relationships. The ‘familialism’ of Laing’s project was one of the main
reasons that Guattari rejected Laing’s model of energetic exchange, framing
it as a broader problem with how Freudian psychoanalysis specified the
problem of madness (Guattari, 1984: 54).
Re-figuring the Capacity to be Affected
What has been emphasized in many contemporary approaches to affect
across the humanities is a retreat to the neurophysiological body in order
to explain the mechanisms of affective transmission (Brennan, 2004;
Connolly, 2002; Massumi, 2002; Wilson, 2004). With the translation of
suggestion as a mechanism for understanding affective transmission into a
set of capacities located within a singular body, we can begin to see the
historical antecedents that have led suggestion to increasingly be specified
through the action of the central nervous system. What we clearly have here
is a redistribution of automaticity, the involuntary and forms of unintentional
communication within the body – and particularly the central nervous
system (see Wilson, 2004), such that the problem of suggestibility or
mimetic desire appears to be resolved. This reactivates and authorizes the
very contrast between compliance and will that redistributed suggestion as
an impure phenomenon and was central to the dismissal of hypnosis as a
therapeutic practice (Chertok and Stengers, 1992). Rather than locate
suggestion within a singular (neurophysiological body) we need to reinvent
suggestion as a concept that points towards the subject in a ‘mode of
unknowingness’ (Butler, 2004). This would engender a rather different set
of relationships between affective transmission and relationality. These
problems paradoxically, I would argue, are being made more urgent and
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visible in the championing of affectivity as the means of addressing flows
in social, material and cultural processes. It is important to think about the
psychological matter that induces cultural inscription, as 19th-century
philosophers and scientists knew all too well. We have veered between the
idea of subjects as blank slates to more cognitively inspired voluntarist
subjects in a see-saw of presumptions about the nature of psychological
matter (see Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001). These presumptions are often
brought in through the back door, when claims are vehemently made about
the unimportance of the psychological in thinking about the spread of
cultural processes.
What is eliminated in this repudiation is the possibility of thinking
about the capacity to affect and be affected as being a complex process of
acceptance and resistance; of contiguity and evolution. Despret (2004a)
plunders James’s work for concepts that will allow new connections,
alliances and articulations to emerge for thinking about affectivity. She also
makes an important point which relates to the argument I am developing;
that is, that studies of affectivity (and I would add the psychological more
generally) must hold together the fact that emotions and affect can be the
site of change and transformation as well as sites that arrest, stick and
solidify the affects and passions of bodies.4 We have seen the way that
solidity and fixity have historically been located within the instinctual and
animal, where particular conceptions of mass or crowd psychology have
been invoked to explore what is figured as the passivity or susceptibility of
particular groups to social influence processes. Despret suggests that any
new articulations to emerge from the translation of concepts from the work
of James must be able to hold the tension between activity and passivity as
a dynamic, complex relation. Valerie Walkerdine (2007) makes this point
in her important new book, which explores how processes of so-called
rationality and irrationality, cognition and desire, reality and fantasy, and,
I would add, suggestibility and inhibition are both sites and processes which
mark the making of subjects in advanced liberalism. It is not simply that
we either resist or acquiesce to social influence, but rather that we do both,
often at the same time, in complex relational practices and dynamics. These
practices may operate at the level of conscious and non-conscious percep-
tion. This approach does much to counter the see-saw from passivity to
activity, from determination to agency, that has beset social and cultural
theory.
Conclusion
The 19th-century science of association that has inspired many contempor-
ary theorists was one that was also concerned with delineating a complex
psychological relationality marked by processes of modification and conti-
nuity. This dynamic relationality was neither inner nor outer, voluntary or
involuntary, but marked by a complex interweaving that was to be finally
settled and refigured through evolutionary biology and psychology. To focus
on matter and assume that the psychological is merely a force which
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animates matter, misses the complex processes of subject-constitution
which are conscious and non-conscious, rational and irrational, cognate and
desirous, real and unreal, material and psychological, historical and natural,
and induce both becoming and becoming-stuck. The realm of the psycho-
social cannot be made to disappear with the invocation of the subject as a
generic nodal position. This is a deleterious move if we forget to be mindful
of the tensions, contradictions, dilemmas and struggles that characterize life
in all its forms (Blackman, 2004, 2005). Katherine Hayles (1999) has
critiqued the disembodied nature of the concept of information that has
characterized much cybernetic discourse. Hayles (1999: 13) attends to the
elisions and suppressions that enabled information to lose its body. The
focus on cognition and the cogito as the means to differentiate the human
from the machine erases the ‘embodied enaction’ (1999: xii) that character-
izes material and psychological life (see Kember, 2003). As a rejoinder to
this, I would argue that ideas of flows (of information) also lose any solidity
to the subject. It is this solidity – this hanging together – which, I want to
argue, poses interesting questions for science studies and social and cultural
theory more generally. It is not that this question is not recognized as import-
ant, but it is left usually as a rhetorical statement rather than being engaged
with in a more psychologically complex way. John Law and Annemarie Mol
argue that ‘attending to multiplicity, then, brings with it the need for new
conceptualizations of what it might mean to hold together’ (2002: 10). These
new conceptualizations might draw life from the very concepts and explana-
tory structures that distribute suggestibility as a phenomena that is both
inner and outer, psychic and social, and material and ephemeral. This
distribution forms the backdrop to the reinvention of life and matter
currently taking hold across sociology, science studies and actor network
theory. Attention to this forgetting places the need for a re-figuring and re-
invention of the psychological as an important, yet neglected, dimension of
social and cultural theory.
Notes
1.
To name such a world, I will employ the term multiverse, put to such good
use by James: the multiverse designates the universe freed from its premature
unification. It is exactly as real as the universe, except the latter can only
register the primary qualities while the former registers all of the articula-
tions (Latour, 2004: 213)
2. Moscovici (1985: 61) claims that both Mussolini and Hitler ransacked Le Bon’s
study of crowd psychology, that it was studied by the military and also became ‘one
of the dominant intellectual forces of the Third Republic’.
3. Toews (2003: 86) suggests that Tarde’s account is not about ‘isolated, fashion-
able individuals who celebrate their own self-centred achievements’.
4. Sara Ahmed (2004) explores these practices of solidity and fixity in relation to
the emotions by exploring how emotions ‘stick’ to certain bodies and mark them as
inferior, dangerous, pathological and so forth.
Blackman – The ‘Problem of Personality’ 47
027-051 085157 Blackman (D)  27/11/07  16:46  Page 47
References
Adler, M. (1990) (ed.) Great Books of the Western World. No. 55. Philosophy and
Religion. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.
Ahmed, S. (2004) The Cultural Politics of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Alliez, E. (2001) ‘Tarde Intempestif’, Multitudes 7(December): 171–6. Translated
as ‘The Difference and Repetition of Gabriel Tarde’, URL (consulted October 2007):
http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/csisp/papers/tarde/alliez.pdf
Apfelbaum, E. and G.R. McGuire (1986) ‘Models of Suggestive Influence and the
Disqualification of the Social Crowd’, in C.F. Graumann and S. Moscovici (eds)
Changing Conceptions of Crowd Mind and Behaviour. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Barrows, S. (1981) Distorting Mirrors. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Becker, R.O. and G. Shelden (1985) The Body Electric. New York: William Morrow
and Co.
Bergson, H. (1920) Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays. London: Henry Holt and Co.
Blackman, L. (2001) Hearing Voices: Embodiment and Experience. London: Free
Association Books.
Blackman, L. (2004) ‘Self-help, Media Cultures and the Production of Female
Psychopathology’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 7(2): 219–36.
Blackman, L. (2005) ‘The Dialogical Self, Flexibility and the Cultural Production
of Psychopathology’, Theory and Psychology 15(2): 183–206.
Blackman, L. (2007) ‘Reinventing Psychological Matters: The Importance of the
Suggestive Realm of Tarde’s Ontology’, Economy and Society 36(4): 574–96.
Blackman, L. and V. Walkerdine (2001) Mass Hysteria: Critical Psychology and
Media Studies. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Borch, C. (2005) ‘Urban Imitations: Tarde’s Sociology Revisited’, Theory, Culture &
Society 22(3): 81–100.
Borch, C. (2006) ‘The Exclusion of the Crowd: The Destiny of a Sociological Figure
of the Irrational’, European Journal of Social Theory 9(1): 83–102.
Brennan, T. (2004) The Transmission of Affect. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Butler, J. (2004) Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London:
Verso.
Chertok, L. and I. Stengers (1992) A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason: Hypnosis
as a Scientific Problem from Lavoisier to Lacan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Carrette, J. (2002) ‘Introduction to Section 2: The Return to James: Psychology,
Religion and the Amnesia of Neuroscience’, in W. James, Varieties of Religious
Experience: A Study in Human Nature. London and New York: Routledge. (First
published 1902.)
Connolly, W.E. (2002) Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Connor, S. (2004) The Book of Skin. London: Reaktion Books.
Damasio, A.R. (2000) The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the
Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
48 Theory, Culture & Society 25(1)
027-051 085157 Blackman (D)  27/11/07  16:46  Page 48
Deleuze, G. (1992) Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. M. Joughin. New
York: Zone Books.
Deleuze, G. (1994) Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton. London: Athlone
Press.
Despret, V. (2004a) Our Emotional Make-Up: Ethnopsychology and Selfhood. New
York: Other Press.
Despret, V. (2004b) ‘The Body We Care For: Figures of Anthropo-zoo-genesis’, Body
& Society 10(2–3): 111–34.
Durham Peters, J. (1999) Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communi-
cation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University (eds) (1909) Studies in History,
Economics and Public Law, vol. 33. New York: Columbia University.
Fast, J. (1971) Body Language. London: Pan Books.
Fraser, M., S. Kember and C. Lury (eds) (2005) ‘Inventive Life: Approaches to the
New Vitalism’, Special Issue, Theory, Culture & Society 22(1).
Freud, S. (1921) Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Standard Edition,
vol. 19. London: Hogarth Press.
Goffman, E. (1969) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Allen Lane.
Grosz, E. (2004) The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution and the Untimely. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Guattari, F. (1984) Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics. Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
Hayles, K. (1999) How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Litera-
ture and Informatics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Henriques, J., W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn and V. Walkerdine (1984) Changing
the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity. London: Methuen.
Hochschild, A. (1983) The Commercialization of Intimate Life: Notes from Home
and Work. Stanford, CA: University of California Press.
James, W. (1890) The Principles of Psychology, vols 1 and 2. New York: Henry Holt
and Co.
James, W. (2002 [1902]) Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human
Nature. London: Routledge.
Kember, S. (2003) Cyberfeminism and Artificial Life. London: Routledge.
Kremor, N., N. Sheeley, J. Reilly, K. Trew and O. Muldoon (2003) Applying Social
Psychology. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Laing, R.D. (1970) Knots. New York: Pantheon Books.
Lash, S. (2006) ‘Life (Vitalism)’, Theory, Culture & Society 23 (2–3): 323–49.
Latour, B. (2002) ‘Gabriel Tarde and the End of the Social’, in P. Joyce (ed.) The
Social in Question: New Bearings in History and the Social Sciences. London:
Routledge.
Latour, B. (2004) ‘How to Talk About the Body? The Normative Dimensions of
Science Studies’, Body & Society 10(2/3): 205–30.
Latour, B. (2005) Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackman – The ‘Problem of Personality’ 49
027-051 085157 Blackman (D)  27/11/07  16:46  Page 49
Law, J. and A. Mol (eds) (2002) Complexities: Social Studies of Knowledge Prac-
tices. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Lazzarato, M. (2004) ‘From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life’, Ephemera. Theory of
the Multitude 4(3): 187–208.
Le Bon, G. (1922) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. London: T. Fisher
Unwin.
Leys, R. (1993) ‘Mead’s Voices: Imitation as Foundation, or, The Struggle against
Mimesis’, Critical Inquiry 19(2): 277–307.
Massumi, B. (2002) Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
McDougall, W. (1910) An Introduction to Social Psychology. London: Methuen.
Moscovici, S. (1985) The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on Mass Psychol-
ogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, G. and R.O. Ballou (eds) (1960) William James on Psychical Research.
New York: Viking.
Orr, J. (2006) Panic Diaries: A Genealogy of Panic Disorder. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
Pfungst, O. (2000) Clever Hans (The Horse of Mr Von Osten). Bristol: Thoemmes
Press.
Rose, N. (1985) The Psychological Complex: Psychology, Politics and Society in
England 1869–1939. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Rose, N. (1989) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self. London:
Routledge.
Rosenthal, R. (1966) Experimenter Effects in Behavioural Research. New York:
Appleton Century Crofts.
Ross, E.A. (1909) Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book. New York:
Macmillan.
Sherif, M. and C. Sherif (1956) An Outline of Social Psychology. London: Harper
and Row.
Sidis, B. (1898) The Psychology of Suggestion: A Research into the Subconscious
Nature of Man and Society. New York: D. Appleton and Co.
Smiles, S. (1864) Self-Help, with Illustrations of Character and Conduct. London:
John Murray.
Smith, R. (1992) Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences of Mind and Brain.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Stengers, I. (1997) Power and Invention: Situating Science. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
Tarde, G. (1962) The Laws of Imitation, trans. R. Howell. Montclair, NJ: Patterson
Smith.
Taylor, E (2002) ‘Introduction’, in W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience: A
Study in Human Nature. London and New York: Routledge. (First published 1902.)
Thrift, N. (2004) ‘Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect’,
Geografiska Annaler 86B(1): 55–76.
50 Theory, Culture & Society 25(1)
027-051 085157 Blackman (D)  27/11/07  16:46  Page 50
Toews, D. (2003) ‘The New Tarde: Sociology after the End of the Social’, Theory,
Culture & Society 20(5): 81–98.
Walkerdine, V. (2007) Children, Gender and Video Games: Towards a Relational
Approach to Multimedia. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Wilson, E. (2004) Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Wundt, W. (1910) Principles of Physiological Psychology, vol. 1, 2nd edn. London:
Swan Sonnenschein.
Lisa Blackman is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Media and
Communications, Goldsmiths College, UK. She works at the intersection of
critical psychology and cultural theory, and particularly on the relationships
between the body, affect and the psychological. She has published two
books, Mass Hysteria: Critical Psychology and Media Studies (with 
V. Walkerdine, Palgrave, 2001) and Hearing Voices: Embodiment and
Experience (Free Association Books, 2001) and is currently completing two
monographs, Immaterial Bodies: Affect, Relationality and the Problem of
Personality (under consideration by Duke University Press) and The Body:
Key Concepts (Berg, forthcoming).
Blackman – The ‘Problem of Personality’ 51
027-051 085157 Blackman (D)  27/11/07  16:46  Page 51
027-051 085157 Blackman (D)  27/11/07  16:46  Page 52
